Schrems I and Schrems II: Assessing the Case for the Extraterritoriality of EU Fundamental Rights by Tzanou, M
 
Schrems I and Schrems II: Assessing the 





The issue of the territorial and extraterritorial application of European Union (EU) data 
privacy rights has attracted significant attention in recent years. Questions of digital 
sovereignty and extraterritoriality have preoccupied regulators, the Court of Justice of 
the EU (CJEU) and commentators alike. The EU’s centrepiece of data protection 
legislation, the GDPR,1 has strengthened the extraterritorial scope of application of EU 
data protection law. However, the main focus of the EU data protection beyond borders 
debate has been on the CJEU’s jurisprudence. In particular, the Court has generated 
significant attention in a first line of cases, such as Google Spain2 and Schrems I,3 that 
established the extraterritorial application of EU privacy rights worldwide. Conversely, 
more recent decisions, such as CNIL v Google,4 have provoked further discussions as 
to whether the Court is exercising some kind of self-restraint with regard to the 
extraterritorial scope of EU data protection rights.  
While the CJEU’s seemingly confusing approach regarding the territorial 
application of EU data privacy rights continues to dominate the debate, scant attention 
has been paid to the factors which form the basis of the extraterritoriality of EU data 
protection rights. This refers to two fundamental problems: one internal and one 
external. The internal problem concerns the interpretation of EU fundamental rights 
 
1 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), OJ, L 119/1, 4 
May 2016. 
2 Case C-131/12 Google Spain SL v Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (‘AEPD’) and Costeja 
González, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317. 
3 Case C-362/14 Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner, ECLI:EU:C:2015:650.  
4 Case C-507/17, Google LLC v Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertés (CNIL), 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:772. 
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and the standards of their extraterritorial application. The external problem refers to 
the examination of foreign law.  
A clear articulation of the internal and external factors of extraterritoriality is 
important if the Court wishes to protect fundamental rights online without being 
accused of engaging in data protection imperialism. The present chapter examines this 
particular aspect of the extraterritoriality by focusing on the application of EU 
fundamental privacy rights to trans-border data flows in the Schrems I and the recently 
decided Schrems II5 cases. The chapter raises two criticisms regarding the Court’s 
structuring of the premises of extraterritoriality in Schrems I. It argues that the CJEU’s 
analysis failed to meaningfully engage with issues relating both to the interpretation of 
EU fundamental rights in the context of their extraterritorial application and to the 
examination of foreign law. More particularly, regarding the internal dimension of the 
problem, I question the invocation of the ‘essence of fundamental rights’ for the 
determination of matters of extraterritorial significance undertaken without appropriate 
theoretical and doctrinal considerations. Schrems I is also problematic with regard to 
the external aspect of extraterritoriality, ie the examination of foreign law. The final 
part of the chapter focuses on the construction of the dimensions of extraterritoriality 
in Schrems II. It concludes that this ruling clarifies both the rules of applicability of EU 
data protection law beyond borders and its substantive requirements and, therefore, 
establishes EU digital rights protection on more solid grounds.     
II. SCHREMS I: DIMENSIONS OF 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY  
A. Safe Harbour and Transatlantic Data Transfers  
The Schrems I case arose from Edward Snowden’s revelations that the National 
Security Agency (NSA) had been operating secret surveillance programmes that 
allowed it to pursue mass surveillance of EU citizens through direct access to the central 
servers of leading US tech giants, such as Facebook, Skype, Microsoft and Yahoo.6 
 
5 Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited and Maximillian Schrems, 
Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 16 July 2020, ECLI:EU:C:2020:559.  
6 Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill ‘NSA Prism program taps in to user data of Apple, Google and 
others’, The Guardian, 7 June 2013. 
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Max Schrems, an Austrian lawyer had been a subscriber to the social network Facebook 
since 2008. He lodged a complaint with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (DPC) 
in June 2013, asking it to prohibit Facebook Ireland from transferring his personal data 
to the US, where it could be subject to NSA surveillance. The Commissioner rejected 
Schrems’ complaint as ‘frivolous or vexatious’ on the basis that it was unsustainable in 
law. Mr Schrems challenged the DPC’s decision before the Irish High Court, which 
decided to stay the proceedings and refer the issue to the CJEU following the 
preliminary reference procedure. The CJEU issued its decision in 2015, concluding that 
the US authorities were able to access the personal data transferred from EU Member 
States and process it beyond what was strictly necessary and proportionate to the 
protection of national security.7  
Before turning to the decision, it is worth taking a closer look at the legal 
background of Schrems I by placing this in the broader context of the EU’s complex 
regulatory framework for trans-border data flows. Under EU data protection law there 
are broadly three mechanisms that allow for personal data to be transferred from the 
EU to a third state. First, transfers can be based on a Commission decision finding that 
the third state ensures an ‘adequate level of protection’.8 In the absence of such a 
decision, the transfer can take place when it is accompanied by ‘appropriate 
safeguards’9 (for example ‘Standard Contractual Clauses’ (SCCs) or Binding Corporate 
Rules (BCRs));10 and in the absence of such safeguards, on the basis of certain 
derogations for specific situations.11 
Among the systems adopted worldwide to regulate trans-border data flows, the 
EU’s adequacy requirement has been characterised as ‘gunboat diplomacy’12 that has 
prompted many countries to change their data protection rules – or indeed introduce 
new ones ‒ in order to be able to receive data transfers from the EU.13 The Commission 
 
7 For a discussion, see Maria Tzanou, ‘European Union Regulation of Transatlantic Data Transfers and 
Online Surveillance’ (2017) 17(3) Human Rights Law Review 545. 
8 Article 45 GDPR. 
9 Article 46 GDPR. 
10 Article 47 GDPR. 
11 Article 49 GDPR. 
12 Vagelis Papakonstantinou and Paul de Hert, ‘The PNR Agreement and Transatlantic Anti-Terrorism 
Co-Operation: No Firm Human Rights Framework on Either Side of the Atlantic’ (2009) 46 Common 
Market Law Review 885, 901. 
13 See Michael Birnhack, ‘The EU Data Protection Directive: An Engine of a Global Regime’ (2008) 
24(6) Computer Law & Security Report 508. 
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has recognised a number of countries or jurisdictions as providing adequate 
protection.14  
There has been no formal adequacy finding regarding the US data privacy 
regime, but the general approach is that the US lacks adequate protection.15 This is 
mainly because the US privacy regime is piecemeal and included in different sources: 
the US Constitution, the Supreme Court case law, federal legislation, State legislation 
and the theory of torts.16 The Constitutional protection of privacy is mainly based on 
the First Amendment (protection of free speech and freedom of assembly), the Fourth 
Amendment (protection from unreasonable searches and seizures), and the Fifth 
Amendment (privilege against self-incrimination).17 The Fourth Amendment, which 
protects personal privacy ‘against unwarranted intrusion by the State’,18 is limited in its 
scope by the so-called third-party doctrine that stipulates that the US Constitution does 
not protect ‘what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or 
office’19 or any ‘information in the hands of third parties’.20 Moreover, the Fourth 
Amendment does not protect persons overseas, such as EU citizens.21 At the federal 
level, there is no omnibus legislation; privacy protection is included in various sector-
specific22 legislative measures that are different for the public and the private sector.23 
 
14 The following countries have been recognised to provide adequate protection: Andorra, Argentina, 
Canada (commercial organisations), Faroe Islands, Guernsey, Israel, Isle of Man, Japan, Jersey, New 
Zealand, Switzerland and Uruguay. 
15 See Maria Tzanou, ‘The EU‒US Data Privacy and Counterterrorism Agreements: What Lessons for 
Transatlantic Institutionalisation?’ in E Fahey (ed), Institutionalisation of EU-US Relations: Multi-
disciplinary Perspectives on Transatlantic Trade and Data Privacy (Springer, 2018), 55; Paul Schwartz, 
‘The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review 
1966; Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 1/99 Concerning the Level of Data Protection in the United 
States and the Ongoing Discussion Between the European Commission and the United States 
Government, 26 January 1999. 
16 Gregory Shaffer, ‘Globalization and Social Protection: The Impact of EU and International Rules in 
the Ratcheting up of U.S. Data Privacy Standards’ (2000) 25 Yale Journal of International Law 1, 22. 
17 Susan Brenner, ‘Constitutional Rights and New Technologies in the United States’ in R Leenes, BJ 
Koops and P De Hert (eds), Constitutional Rights and new technologies: A comparative Study (TMC 
Asser Press, Distributed by Cambridge University Press, 2008) 225, 230. 
18 Schmerber v California, 384 US 757 (1966). It should be noted, however, that the Fourth Amendment 
has not been interpreted to afford a ‘comprehensive right to personal data protection’. See Francesca 
Bignami, ‘The US legal system on data protection in the field of law enforcement. Safeguards, rights and 
remedies for EU citizens’, Study for the LIBE Committee, PE 519.215, (European Union, Brussels, 
2015), p 8, available at: 
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/519215/IPOL_STU(2015)519215_EN.pd
f; Maria Tzanou, The Fundamental Right to Data Protection: Normative Value in the Context of Counter-
Terrorism Surveillance (Hart Publishing, 2017). 
19 Katz v United States, 389 US 347 (1967). 
20 Ibid. 
21 United States v Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 US 1092 (1990).  
22 Shaffer (n 16 above).  
23 Schwartz (n 15 above), 1974. 
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Regarding the oversight of the US privacy legislation, ‘the closest that the United States 
comes to a national data protection agency is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)’,24 
which faces significant limits in its enforcement powers.25 
In order to allow for international trade, transatlantic data flows between the EU 
and the US were made possible26 (between 2000 and 2015) through the Safe Harbour 
scheme.27 Safe Harbour was based on a system of voluntary self-certification and self-
assessment of US-based companies that they abide with certain data protection 
principles (the ‘Safe Harbour principles’), combined with some intervention by the 
public authorities. In particular, under the scheme, US companies were required to 
register their compliance with the Safe Harbour principles with the US Department of 
Commerce, while the FTC was responsible for enforcing the agreement. On the basis 
of this, the Commission issued the Safe Harbour Decision recognising the adequacy of 
protection provided by the Safe Harbour principles. Safe Harbour proved to be an 
important tool of transatlantic commercial relations, with over 3200 companies signing 
up to the scheme. It has also been argued that Safe Harbour has levelled up US privacy 
protection standards.28 Nevertheless, it was found to suffer from major weaknesses in 
terms of compliance by the self-certified companies and enforcement and oversight by 
the US authorities,29 and the Snowden revelations raised additional concerns about the 
systematic access of US law enforcement authorities to data held by the private 
companies certified under the scheme.30   
As mentioned above, the Commission’s Safe Harbour adequacy decision was 
eventually invalidated by the CJEU in its Schrems I judgment delivered on 6 October 
2015. In that case, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the adequacy criterion. 
While noting that there was no definition provided in law of the concept of an adequate 
 
24 Ibid, 1977. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Transatlantic data flows also take place through SCC and BCR.  
27 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC of 26 July 2000 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the safe harbour privacy 
principles and related frequently asked questions issued by the US Department of Commerce (notified 
under document number C(2000) 2441), OJ 2000 L 215/7. 
28 Shaffer (n 16 above), 22. 
29 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Functioning 
of the Safe Harbour from the Perspective of EU Citizens and Companies Established in the EU, Brussels, 
27 November 2013, COM(2013) 847 final.  
30 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Rebuilding Trust 
in EU-US Data Flows’, 27 November 2013, COM(2013) 846 final, 13. 
 6 
level of protection,31 the CJEU observed that adequacy does not require a level of 
protection ‘identical to that guaranteed in the EU legal order’, but nevertheless 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms that is ‘essentially equivalent’ to that of 
the EU.32 This requires an assessment of the content of the applicable domestic and 
international law rules in the third country as well as the practice designed to ensure 
compliance with those rules. The ‘essentially equivalent’ criterion shows that the Court 
is trying to bring external legal systems as close as possible to the EU’s internal data 
protection legal framework33 in order to ensure that domestic data protection rules are 
not circumvented by transfers of personal data from the EU to third countries.34 
This approach is closely linked to the elevation of data protection to the level of 
a fundamental right that makes the EU’s exercise of jurisdiction ‘not just … permissive 
(discretionary), but also mandatory’.35 This necessarily means that trans-border data 
flows should be regarded as part of the EU institutions’ fundamental rights protective 
duty.36 Indeed, the Court stated that individuals cannot be deprived of their fundamental 
rights by the transfer of their data to third countries.37 A valid argument can be made, 
therefore, in favour of the extraterritorial application of EU data protection standards.38 
In Schrems I, the Court applied EU fundamental rights law to data processing in the US 
by identifying the problems of the Commission’s adequacy decision, rather than 
directly challenging the US legislation.  
B. Establishing the Internal Dimension of Extraterritoriality 
 
31 Schrems I (n 3 above), para 70. 
32 Ibid, para 73. 
33 Steve Peers, ‘The party’s over: EU data protection law after the Schrems Safe Harbour judgment’, 7 
October 2015, www.eulawanalysis.blogspot.co.uk/2015/10/the-partys-over-eu-data-protection-
law.html.   
34 Schrems I (n 3 above), para 73. 
35 Cedric Ryngaert and Mistale Taylor, ‘Symposium on the GDPR and International Law: The GDPR 
as Global Data Protection Regulation?’ (2019) AJIL Unbound 5, 6.  
36 See Christopher Kuner, Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (Oxford University Press, 
2013), 129‒33. It should be noted that unlike international human rights treaties such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR) 
does not have a limiting jurisdictional clause. 
37 Schrems I (n 3 above), para 58. 
38 Christopher Kuner, ‘Extraterritoriality and Regulation of International Data Transfers in EU Data 
Protection Law’ (2015) 5(4) International Data Privacy Law 235; Mistale Taylor, ‘The EU’s human 
right obligations in relation to its data protection laws with extraterritorial effect’ (2015) 5(4) 
International Data Privacy Law 246; Maja Brkan, ‘The Unstoppable Expansion of the EU Fundamental 
Right to Data Protection: Little Shop of Horrors?’ (2016) 23(5) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 812.  
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There are a number of problems regarding the CJEU’s interpretation of the law that 
determined the extraterritorial application of EU data privacy rights in Schrems I. I 
focus here on one that is particularly problematic: the Court’s discussion of the 
‘essence’ of fundamental rights. 
It should be recalled that the CJEU found in Schrems I that the essence of both 
the fundamental rights to privacy in the European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(Article 7 EUCFR) and to effective judicial protection (Article 47 EUCFR) had been 
breached. According to the CJEU, the essence of the fundamental right to privacy was 
breached because the US mass online surveillance programmes grant access on a 
generalised basis not only to communications metadata but to the actual content of 
electronic communications.39 The essence of the right to effective judicial protection 
was compromised because the US legislation does not provide EU persons with 
sufficient guarantees and effective legal remedies to exercise their data access, 
rectification and erasure rights.40 The CJEU applied, in the Schrems I case, Article 52(1) 
EUCFR which is one of the horizontal provisions of the Charter detailing its 
interpretation and application and which states: ‘Any limitation on the exercise of the 
rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must … respect the essence of those 
rights and freedoms’. 
The CJEU analysis in Schrems I regarding the essence of the right to privacy 
raises both theoretical and practical questions. Starting from the theoretical questions, 
what exactly is the ‘essence of fundamental rights’, and how is this essence to be 
determined? Does the concept of the essence signify a maximum or a minimum41 level 
of protection?42 Is the essence of fundamental rights to be considered ‘absolute’, 
meaning that it ‘can claim validity in all legal systems’43 or is this a relative concept 
that can have a different meaning in each particular case? Besides the theoretical 
 
39 Schrems I (n 3 above), para 94. 
40 Ibid, para 95.  
41 Understood as preventing the complete diminishing or negation of a right. See for instance the ECtHR 
cases Baka v Hungary, Application No 20261/12, para 121 and Christine Goodwin v United Kingdom, 
Application No 28957/95, paras 99‒101. 
42 See Maja Brkan, ‘The concept of essence of fundamental rights in the EU legal order: peeling the 
onion to its core’ (2018) European Constitutional Law Review 332; Katharine G. Young, ‘The Minimum 
Core of Economic and Social Rights: A Concept in Search of Content’ (2008) 33 Yale Journal of 
International Law 113.   
43 Robert Alexy, ‘The Absolute and the Relative Dimensions of Constitutional Rights’ (2017) 37(1) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31. See also Robert Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
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problems, there are also practical questions regarding the essence of fundamental rights: 
Who is to determine this and how? Are the courts the ones to determine the essence of 
rights? If so, which courts exactly? Specialised human rights courts, like the ECtHR 
and constitutional courts or every court? How are courts to determine the essence of a 
fundamental right? Do they do this following their own intuition or is there another 
way? What happens if the courts get the essence of a fundamental right wrong? How 
can a legal system (local or global) deal with conflicting judgments regarding the 
essence of fundamental rights? 
These theoretical and practical questions are valid in general; however, they are 
compelling in the context of trans-border data flows that might entail the extraterritorial 
application of fundamental rights. Until now, both these sets of questions seemed quite 
philosophical, but in Schrems I, by finding a violation of the essence of two rights, the 
CJEU made this discussion very real. Admittedly, in Digital Rights Ireland44 the CJEU 
had already indicated what constitutes the essence of the right to privacy: the access to 
the content of the data. Nevertheless, Schrems I constitutes a landmark, because while 
in the past the CJEU had indeed spoken in a number of cases about the essence of 
fundamental rights and more specifically in what I am more interested here ‒ the 
essence of the rights to privacy and data protection ‒ it had never found an actual breach 
of these.  
Going back to the questions raised earlier, the issue becomes particularly 
problematic when these are examined in the context of trans-border data flows and the 
extraterritorial application of fundamental rights.  
First, one might wonder why the Court did not follow the path it had taken in 
its previous Digital Rights Ireland judgment that was decided on the basis of a 
proportionality assessment, but it went straight to find a breach of the essence of the 
right to privacy, without discussing proportionality at all. Different authors have given 
different answers to this. Some have argued that the triggering of the essence of 
fundamental rights at issue really determined the outcome of the case, without there 
being ‘any need to examine the content of the safe harbour principles’, ‘address any 
other legal arguments made’ or having to balance between privacy and security. This 
 
44 Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources and Others (C-293/12) and Karntner Landesregierung and Others (C-
594/12), ECLI:EU:C:2014:238.  
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explanation appears tautological: the CJEU is assumed to recognise an infringement of 
the essence of a right when it sees it and, therefore, a discussion of proportionality is 
simply not needed.45 However, I argue that there might be other reasons underpinning 
the Court’s essence of fundamental rights analysis.46 In my view, these may be related 
with the extraterritorial application of EU fundamental rights.47 The Court, indeed, 
confirmed in Schrems I the application of the fundamental rights to privacy and 
effective judicial protection outside the EU territorial boundaries, but it is possible that 
it opted to limit this extraterritorial reach to serious circumstances in which the  
‘essence’ of EU fundamental rights was affected.48  
In this respect, the use of the ‘essence’ of EU fundamental rights as a factor to 
establish the extraterritoriality of these rights and invalidate a trans-border data transfer 
that violates these appears somewhat paradoxical: on the one hand, the essence of 
fundamental rights is the most serious infringement of fundamental rights that can be 
established (signifying a maximum level of protection). On the other hand, this can be 
seen as an exercise of self-restraint by the Court when it deals with extraterritorial 
questions: foreign laws would be considered problematic and invalidated only when 
they impinge on the very essence of EU fundamental rights (signifying a minimum level 
of protection within the context of trans-border data flows).   
Secondly, the lack of depth of the CJEU’s analysis of the essence of the 
fundamental to privacy is particularly troubling. The Court did not come up with a clear 
methodological approach or a comprehensive doctrinal justification why the essence of 
this right was breached in that case. It just drew a supposed red line ‒ first laid down in 
Digital Rights Ireland ‒ between generalised access to the content of communications 
and access to metadata, and concluded that the former constitutes the essence of the 
fundamental right to privacy. This conclusion can be criticised as erroneous, as it clearly 
disregards the fact that in the context of the Internet and modern digital technologies 
such a distinction between accessing the content of communications and the metadata 
 
45 Martin Scheinin, ‘Towards Evidence-based Discussion on Surveillance: A Rejoinder to Richard A. 
Epstein’ (2016) 12(2) European Constitutional Law Review 341 at 343. 
46 See Loïc Azoulai and Marijn van der Sluis, ‘Institutionalizing personal data protection in times of 
global institutional distrust: Schrems. Case C-362/14, Maximillian Schrems v Data Protection 
Commissioner, joined by Digital Rights Ireland, judgment of the Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) of 6 
October 2015, EU:C:2015:650’ (2016) 53 Common Market Law Review 1343, 1365; David Cole et al 
(eds), Surveillance, Privacy and Trans-Atlantic Relations (Hart Publishing, 2017). 
47 See also Brkan (n 42 above), 354.  
48 See Kuner (n 36 above), 242‒43. 
 10 
is often artificial and very problematic. It is artificial because in the online, digital 
world, many Internet metadata, such as a simple Google search or the subject of an 
email, already reveals the content of the communication as well.49 It is extremely 
problematic because metadata using modern data mining and algorithmic techniques 
can often reveal more precise and sensitive information than the data subjects are aware 
of themselves.50  
I submit that the essence of fundamental rights should not be a mere symbolic, 
abstract idea of human rights protection, but it should be something that can come into 
play in real cases. That being said, the CJEU should resist the temptation of 
reformulating simply any fundamental rights issues ‒ admittedly very serious ones ‒ as 
an infringement of the essence of fundamental rights, even if these issues do cause a 
public outrage. The essence of fundamental rights is necessarily a vague notion and 
should to an extent remain so. Here, I agree with Robert Alexy about the abstractness 
of human rights in general. As Alexy has noted, ‘human rights refer to abstract subject 
matter, like liberty and equality, life and property, freedom of speech and protection of 
personality.’51 In contrast, the CJEU in Schrems I pinpointed in a dangerously accurate 
manner not just the content, but the very essence of the right to privacy, to the access 
to content of communications as opposed to metadata. Such an approach is problematic 
because not only it is based on an artificial distinction but because it also ends up 
prescribing in definitive – and possible incorrect ‒ terms the essence of privacy, that 
will probably do more harm than good to digital privacy protection and the claim for 
informational sovereignty in the Internet context.  
C. Establishing the External Dimension of Extraterritoriality 
The CJEU’s construction of extraterritoriality in Schrems I is problematic in its external 
dimension as well. This refers to the problem of the examination of the foreign law.  
 
49 See Digital Rights Ireland (n 44 above), para 27; Joined Cases C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige 
and Watson and Others, ECLI:EU:C:2016:970; and Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe in Case C-
311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Limited, Maximillian Schrems, delivered on 
19 December 2019, ECLI:EU:C:2019:1145, para 257. 
50 See also Malone v United Kingdom, Application No 8691/79, 2 August 1984, [1984] ECHR 10, para 
84; Ben Faiza v France, Application No 31446/12, 8 February 2018, para 66. 
51 Alexy (n 43 above), 34.  
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Scholars, particularly, on the other side of the Atlantic, have been very critical 
of the CJEU’s assessment of US law in Schrems I.52 In particular, it seems that the 
finding of a breach of the essence of rights spared the Court from dealing with the issue 
of how complete information concerning the third country’s surveillance can be 
obtained and used in a judgment. The Court has been accused by mainly American 
scholars of relying ‘on sources that took at face value news articles containing 
substantial falsehoods regarding US surveillance’; of engaging ‘in a series of errors’; 
and, of being driven ‘by EU perceptions that ignore reality’.53  
These accusations should be taken seriously when considering the 
extraterritorial impact of the Court’s decision. To put it differently, the essence of 
fundamental rights cannot be used as a quick, easy-fix solution that bars the Court from 
seriously considering foreign law,54 just because the case concerns a particularly 
sensitive issue involving a third country that provoked public outrage. A careful and 
thorough examination of foreign law is necessary if a valid argument is to be made that 
EU fundamental rights override this. The temptation of finding that politically sensitive 
cases trigger the essence of fundamental rights opens up the risk of producing 
inaccurate or incorrect conclusions that go beyond a particular case: they undermine 
the very foundations of the claim for digital sovereignty and expose this as a disguised 
case of data privacy imperialism.  
III. SCHREMS II: A MORE ROBUST CASE FOR THE 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY OF EU DATA PRIVACY 
RIGHTS 
A. Privacy Shield 
 
52 Richard A Epstein, ‘The ECJ’s Fatal Imbalance: Its Cavalier Treatment of National Security Issues 
Poses Serious Risk to Public Safety and Sound Commercial Practices’ (2016) 12(2) European 
Constitional Law Review 330; Russell A Miller (ed), Privacy and Power: A Transatlantic Dialogue in 
the Shadow of the NSA-Affair (Cambridge University Press, 2017).   
53 David Bender, ‘Having mishandled Safe Harbor, will the CJEU do better with Privacy Shield? A US 
perspective’ (2016) 6(2) International Data Protection Law 117, 118.  
54 It should be noted that the CJEU dealt with the validity of the Commission’s Safe Harbour adequacy 
decision, on which it has jurisdiction to rule, rather than directly challenging the US legislation. See 
Tzanou (n 7 above), 553.  
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Privacy Shield55 was adopted in July 2016 to replace Safe Harbour, invalidated by the 
CJEU in Schrems I. It comprised a ‘byzantine compilation of documents’56 that 
included the European Commission’s adequacy decision, the US Department of 
Commerce Privacy Shield Principles (Annex II) and the US government’s official 
representations and commitments on the enforcement of the arrangement (Annexes I 
and III to VII).  
Similarly to its predecessor, Privacy Shield was based on a system of self-
certification by which US organisations committed to a set of privacy principles. 
However, unlike Safe Harbour that contained only a general exception for the purposes 
of national security, the Privacy Shield decision included a section on the access and 
use of personal data transferred under the agreement by US public authorities for 
national security and law enforcement purposes.57 In this, the Commission found that 
there are rules in place in the United States designed to limit any interference for 
national security purposes with the fundamental rights of the persons whose personal 
data are transferred from the EU to the US to what is strictly necessary to achieve the 
legitimate objective in question.58 
This conclusion was based on the representations and assurances provided by the Office 
of the Director of National Surveillance (ODNI) (Annex VI), the US Department of 
Justice (Annex VII) and the US Secretary of State (Annex III), which describe the 
limitations, oversight and opportunities for judicial redress under the US surveillance 
programmes. 
Serious concerns have been raised as to whether Privacy Shield complies with 
EU data protection and privacy standards.59 As I have argued elsewhere,60 the 
Commission based its Privacy Shield adequacy analysis merely on a detailed 
description of US law ‒ found in the US assurances ‒ without any substantive 
 
55 Commission Implementing Decision of 12.7.2016 pursuant to Directive 95/46/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the adequacy of the protection provided by the EU‒U.S. Privacy Shield, 
Brussels, 12 July 2016, C(2016) 4176 final. 
56 Elaine Fahey, ‘Introduction: Institutionalisation beyond the Nation State: New Paradigms? 
Transatlantic Relations: Data Privacy and Trade Law’ in E Fahey (ed), Institutionalisation beyond the 
Nation State: Transatlantic Relations: Data Privacy and Trade Law (Springer, 2017) 1.  
57 See Tzanou (n 7 above); Tzanou (n 15 above).  
58 Privacy Shield (n 55 above), recital 88. 
59 See WP29, Opinion 1/2016 of 13 April 2016 on the EU‒U.S. Privacy Shield draft adequacy decision 
WP 238; Resolution of the Parliament of 6 April 2017 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by 
the EU‒US Privacy Shield, P8_TA(2017)0131, para 17; Report of the Parliament of 20 February 2017 
on fundamental rights implications of big data: privacy, data protection, non-discrimination, security 
and law-enforcement A8-0044/2017, paragraph 17; European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2018 on 
the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU‒US Privacy Shield, P8_TA(2018)0315, para 22. 
60 Tzanou (n 7 above), 561‒63.  
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commitments (with the exception of the Ombudsperson) being undertaken by the US 
authorities to comply with EU fundamental rights requirements as laid down by the 
CJEU in Schrems I. Privacy Shield has also been criticised for the lack of oversight of 
US surveillance programmes, the lack of judicial redress and the shortcomings of the 
Ombudsperson mechanism.61 
A. The Judgment  
The CJEU confirmed in Schrems I a new procedural safeguard regarding the 
extraterritoriality of EU data protection rights: DPAs were granted the power to 
investigate individuals’ complaints alleging a third country’s non-compliance with EU 
fundamental rights ‒ despite the Commission’s adequacy decision on the matter ‒ and, 
if they consider them well-founded, to initiate proceedings before national courts, 
which must then make a preliminary reference to the CJEU on the validity of the 
Commission’s decision. 
Schrems II arises from this new procedural DPA power. The factual 
background of this case is very similar to the 2016 Schrems I case. Following the 
invalidation of Safe Harbour, Max Schrems asked the DPC to suspend the transfer of 
his personal data held by Facebook Ireland to Facebook, Inc, its parent company 
established in the USA, on the basis that these could be made available to US 
authorities, such as the NSA and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the 
context of surveillance programmes that impede the exercise of the rights guaranteed 
in Articles 7, 8 and 47 EUCFR. The legal background of the claim this time concerned 
data transfers in the US under SCCs on the basis of Decision 2010/87.62 As the DPC 
took the view that the assessment of Mr Schrems’ complaint was conditional on the 
validity of Decision 2010/87, it initiated proceedings before the Irish High Court and 
requested that this made a preliminary reference to the CJEU to seek clarification on 
that point.  
 
61 See, WP29, EU‒U.S. Privacy Shield ‒ First Annual Joint Review, 28 November 2017, WP 255; 
European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2018 on the adequacy of the protection afforded by the EU-
US Privacy Shield, P8_TA(2018)0315 (paragraph 22); and EDPB, EU‒U.S. Privacy Shield ‒ Second 
Annual Joint Review, 22 January 2019. 
62 Commission Decision of 5 February 2010 on standard contractual clauses for the transfer of personal 
data to processors established in third countries under Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council (OJ 2010 L 39/5), as amended by Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 
2016/2297 of 16 December 2016 (OJ 2016 L 344/100, ‘Decision 2010/87’). 
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Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe delivered a lengthy Opinion in the case 
in December 2019.63 The AG focused primarily on the validity of Decision 2010/87. 
The AG concluded that the SCC decision was valid and invited the CJEU not to deal 
with the validity of Privacy Shield even though the High Court had submitted several 
preliminary questions in this regard.64 Nevertheless, the AG went on to offer some 
‘alternative observations’ relating to the effects and the validity of Privacy Shield, 
finding that this did not conform with Article 45(1) GDPR, read in the light of Articles 
7, 8 and 47 EUCFR and Article 8 ECHR.    
In a landmark judgment delivered on 16 July 2020, the CJEU agreed with the 
AG that the SCC decision remains valid,65 but annulled the Privacy Shield adequacy 
decision despite the AG’s call for restraint. The invalidation of Privacy Shield raises 
significant questions regarding the future of transatlantic data flows. Indeed, Schrems 
II has important theoretical and practical ramifications that go well beyond transatlantic 
relations. The judgment constructs new requirements for legal mechanisms for trans-
border data transfers other than adequacy decisions, such as for instance SCCs. While 
the validity of SCCs was confirmed by the Court in the case, the conditions for their 
use in third states that require government access to personal data become significantly 
complicated and raise questions about the role of private companies, such as Facebook, 
in assessing that the legal regimes of third countries ‘do not go beyond what is necessary 
… to safeguard … national security’66 and in providing ‘additional safeguards’67 to 
those offered by the SCCs where necessary;68 as well as the powers of the DPAs69 and 
the EDPB. These issues fall outside the scope of this chapter, which focuses instead on 
the construction by the Court of the internal and external dimensions of the 
extraterritoriality of EU fundamental rights in the context of the examination of Privacy 
Shield.   
 
63 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe (n 49 above).  
64 Ibid, paras 173, 178 and 180‒183. 
65 Schrems II (n 5 above), para 149. 
66 Ibid, para 141. 
67 EDPD, Frequently Asked Questions on the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in 
Case C-311/18 ‒ Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd and Maximillian Schrems, 
Adopted on 23 July 2020.  
68 Schrems II (n 5 above), para 134.  
69 Ibid, para 121. 
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C. Privacy Shield and the Construction of the Extraterritoriality of EU 
Data Privacy Rights 
The CJEU’s assessment of Privacy Shield is more carefully elaborated compared to the 
assessment of Safe Harbour in Schrems I. Overall, the Court’s analysis in Schrems II 
pays closer attention to the internal and external dimensions of extraterritoriality and 
their respective interlinks. This is demonstrable for a number of reasons. 
First, the Court clearly established the standard of protection under which the 
validity of the Privacy Shield decision should be ascertained: this should comply ‘with 
the requirements stemming from the GDPR read in the light of the Charter’.70 This 
pronouncement is significant because it provides legal certainty regarding the legal 
standard under which the Commission’s adequacy decisions (and foreign law) are to be 
judged. It also clarifies that the GDPR  
applies to the transfer of personal data for commercial purposes by an economic 
operator established in a Member State to another economic operator established in a 
third country, irrespective of whether, at the time of that transfer or thereafter, that 
data is liable to be processed by the authorities of the third country in question for the 
purposes of public security, defence and State security.71 
The possibility, therefore, that personal data transferred between two economic 
operators for commercial purposes might undergo, at the time of the transfer or 
thereafter, processing for the purposes of national security by the authorities of a third 
country ‘cannot remove that transfer from the scope of the GDPR’.72  
Second, the substantive examination of the internal dimension of 
extraterritoriality steers clear of the analysis on the ‘essence’ of the rights to privacy 
and to effective judicial protection and the confusion that arose thereof in Schrems I. 
The Court made clear, however, that US national security requirements cannot be given 
primacy over data protection principles.73 Schrems II thus aligns with established case 
law concerning internal cases of surveillance where individuals’ data privacy rights are 
the point of departure to ascertain the constitutional legitimacy of any interference 
posed by public policy objectives such as national security.74 This confirms that the 
 
70 Ibid, para 161. 
71 Ibid, para 89. 
72 Ibid, para 86. 
73 Ibid, para 164. See also Schrems I (n 3), para 86.  
74 See Maria Tzanou ‘The Future of EU Data Privacy Law: Towards a More Egalitarian Data Privacy’ 
(2020) 7(2) Journal of International and Comparative Law (Symposium Special Issue) (forthcoming 
December 2020).  
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normative starting point for the examination of external surveillance measures should 
be the same as that on the basis of which internal surveillance measures are examined. 
Third, the examination of the external dimension of the extraterritoriality is 
more carefully crafted in this case than in Schrems I. In particular, the Court in Schrems 
II laid down with sufficient clarity the factors that should be considered when assessing 
external limitations to fundamental rights in light of Article 52(1) EUCFR. These 
factors are (i) such limitations must be provided for by law; (ii) the legal basis which 
permits the interference with fundamental rights must itself define the scope of the 
limitation on the exercise of the right concerned;75 (iii) to satisfy the requirement of 
proportionality, the legislation in question must lay down ‘clear and precise rules 
governing the scope and application’ of the relevant measures and ‘imposing minimum 
safeguards, so that the persons whose data has been transferred have sufficient 
guarantees to protect effectively their personal data against the risk of abuse’;76 and, 
(iv) the third country must provide ‘effective and enforceable data subject rights’ for 
persons whose personal data is transferred.77 These requirements construct a four-prong 
fundamental rights test, applicable to the merits of the examination of foreign 
surveillance programmes, thus providing legal certainty in an area of law that has 
remained unpredictable since the invalidation of the Safe Harbour principles in Schrems 
I.    
Having established a reasonably clear test on the substantive requirements that 
foreign surveillance measures should satisfy in order to comply with EU fundamental 
rights, the Court proceeded to apply this in the context of US surveillance programmes. 
First, the CJEU held that neither section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA),78 nor Executive Order 12333,79 read in conjunction with Presidential Policy 
 
75 Schrems II (n 5 above), para 175. 
76 Ibid, para 176. 
77 Ibid, para 177. 
78 50 U.S.C. § 1881. Section 702 FISA allows the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be 
located outside the United States to acquire ‘foreign intelligence information’ and provides the basis for 
the PRISM and UPSTREAM surveillance programmes. Under the PRISM programme, Internet service 
providers are required to supply the NSA with all communications to and from a ‘selector’, some of 
which are also transmitted to the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Under the  
UPSTREAM programme, telecommunications undertakings operating the ‘backbone’ of the Internet 
—the network of cables, switches and routers — are required to allow the NSA to copy and filter 
Internet traffic flows in order to acquire communications from, to or about a non-US national 
associated with a ‘selector’. 
79 E.O. 12333: United States Intelligence Activities, Federal Register Vol. 40, No 235 (8 December 
1981). E.O. 12333 allows the NSA to access data ‘in transit’ to the United States, by accessing 
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Directive 28 (PPD-28) Signals Intelligence Activities, correlate to ‘the minimum 
safeguards’ required to satisfy the principle of proportionality.80 This is because section 
702 FISA ‘does not indicate any limitations on the power it confers to implement 
surveillance programmes for the purposes of foreign intelligence or the existence of 
guarantees for non-US persons potentially targeted by those programmes’;81 and, EO 
12333 that allows for access to data in transit does not ‘delimit in a sufficiently clear 
and precise manner the scope of … bulk collection of personal data’.82 Second, the 
Court examined data subjects’ rights in the US and found that these subjects ‘have no 
right to an effective remedy’83 because neither PPD-28 nor EO 12333 grant data 
subjects ‘rights actionable in the courts against the US authorities’,84 the Ombudsperson 
does not have the power to adopt decisions that are binding on intelligence services85 
and the latter’s independence can be undermined by the executive.86  
Overall, the Court’s analysis in Schrems II is ‘unprecedented for the level of 
detail’87 with which the CJEU interrogates the US surveillance programmes. This is 
explained by the fact that, unlike Safe Harbour, a detailed description of US national 
security and surveillance law was included in the Commission’s Privacy Shield 
adequacy decision. It can, therefore, be argued that the external dimension of 
extraterritoriality, namely the examination of foreign law, was an easier task for the 
Court with respect to Privacy Shield than with Safe Harbour, as the former explicitly 
contained the legal bases regarding US authorities’ access to personal data. The 
invalidation of Privacy Shield can be seen, therefore, less as a claim of data imperialism 
and more as ‘punishing’ the Commission for its failure to address the problems 
identified in Safe Harbour and reach a robust adequacy finding. 
It has been pointed out that the extraterritorial application of data privacy rights 
must be based on ‘rules that are reasonably clear and predictable, both with regard to 
 
underwater cables on the floor of the Atlantic Ocean, and to collect and retain such data before arriving 
in the United States and being subject there to the FISA. 
80 Schrems II (n 5 above), para 184. 
81 Ibid, para 180. 
82 Ibid, para 183. 
83 Ibid, paras 181, 182 and 192. 
84 Ibid, para 192. 
85 Ibid, para 196. 
86 Ibid, para 195. 
87 Kristina Irion, ‘Schrems II and Surveillance: Third Countries’ National Security Powers in the Purview 
of EU Law’, European Law Blog, 24 July 2020, www.europeanlawblog.eu/2020/07/24/schrems-ii-and-
surveillance-third-countries-national-security-powers-in-the-purview-of-eu-law/#more-6410. 
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the threshold question of applicability and with regard to the merits’ (emphasis 
added).88 Schrems II achieves both these requirements. It first establishes the 
applicability of EU data protection law to adequacy decisions for trans-border data 
flows under ‘the GDPR read in the light of the Charter’.  
Regarding the examination on the merits of the extraterritorial application of 
EU fundamental rights, the CJEU could have proceeded in two ways: One approach 
would be to apply the analytical framework of Article 52(1) EUCFR, as developed 
internally, to external cases of interference with privacy and data protection rights (I 
call this the inflexible approach). A second way would be to flesh out an amended test 
on the merits for external surveillance ‒ ‘if the differences between the internal and 
external settings so warrant’89 (I call this the flexible approach). In Schrems I the CJEU 
seemed to have followed the inflexible approach: it assessed the interference of US 
surveillance measures with the EUCFR on the basis of the ‘essence’ of EU fundamental 
rights. As seen above, this raised questions as to whether it implied a maximum or a 
minimum level of protection of rights in the extraterritorial context.  
In Schrems II the CJEU adopted the flexible approach: it constructed a four-
pronged test applicable to external interferences by interpreting Article 52(1) EUCFR 
in this context. The substance of the test illustrates that the Court is willing to recognise 
potential differences between the internal and the external settings: the test requires that 
foreign law imposes ‘minimum safeguards’, so that the persons whose data has been 
transferred to third countries have some enforceable rights and sufficient protection 
‘against the risk of abuse’ (emphasis added). Swire argues that ‘[f]or national security 
experts, it is puzzling in the extreme to think that citizens of one country have a right 
to review their intelligence files from other countries’.90 This is not what the CJEU is 
requiring with its newly-devised merits test. The insistence on minimum guarantees and 
general requirements to prevent abuse demonstrates that the Court is well aware of the 
external constraints. It applies fundamental rights requirements more flexibly in the 
external context, while being cautious at the same time not to deprive them of their 
 
88 Marko Milanovic, ‘Human Rights Treaties and Foreign Surveillance: Privacy in the Digital Age’ 
(2015) 56 Harvard International Law Journal 81, 132.  
89 Ibid, 138.  
90 Peter Swire, ‘“Schrems II” backs the European legal regime into a corner — How can it get out?’, 
International Association of Privacy Professionals (IAPP), 16 July 2020, www.iapp.org/news/a/schrems-
ii-backs-the-european-legal-regime-into-a-corner-how-can-it-get-out/ . 
 19 
substance91 by rendering their application so flexible ‘that it ceases to have any impact 
or compromises the integrity of the whole regime’.92   
IV. POTENTIAL CRITICISMS 
Despite the Court’s attempt to be flexible in the extraterritorial context, a crucial 
question remains: Does the CJEU’s new test for external interference with data privacy 
rights show a ‘reasonable degree of pragmatism in order to allow interaction with other 
parts of the world’?93 Does it recognise adequately that while ‘the protection of personal 
data … within the European Union meets a particularly high standard’ ‘the law of the 
third State of destination may reflect its own scale of values according to which the 
respective weight of the various interests involved may diverge from that attributed to 
them in the EU legal order’?94  
Initial reactions by American commentators show that this is not the case. 
Schrems II is a decision that has not been received with enthusiasm on the other side of 
the Atlantic. Indeed, an American commentator declared that the ruling is 
‘gobsmacking in its mix of judicial imperialism and Eurocentric hypocrisy’ and noted 
that ‘it is astonishing that a European court would assume it has authority to kill or 
cripple critical American intelligence programs by raising the threat of massive 
sanctions on American companies’.95 But even less angry voices consider that ‘the 
CJEU provides very little room for effective protection against military action’ that is 
premised on ‘needed intelligence activities’.96  
I argue that in order to answer the above questions one needs to take a step back 
and delve deeper into the claim for extraterritoriality of privacy rights. What is the 
rationale behind the claim for the extraterritoriality of privacy? Or, to put it more 
simply, why is the extraterritoriality of privacy rights needed? So far, this claim has 
been examined within the context where (the GDPR) and the CJEU has placed it in the 
Schrems I and II judgments. For the Court, the answer to ‘Why extraterritoriality of EU 
 
91 Opinion of AG (n 49 above), para 249.  
92 Milanovic (n 88 above), 132.  
93 Opinion of AG Saugmandsgaard Øe (n 49 above), para 7. 
94 Ibid, para 249. 
95 Stewart Baker, ‘How Can the U.S. Respond to Schrems II?’, Lawfare, 21 July 2020, 
www.lawfareblog.com/how-can-us-respond-schrems-ii.   
96 Swire (n 90 above).  
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privacy rights?’ is simple: personal data transferred to third countries should be 
followed by adequate data privacy protections. Extraterritoriality is therefore 
essentially linked to the trans-border/ extraterritorial personal data flow element; since 
data travels, data protection laws (the GDPR) are applicable as well. This centring of 
extraterritoriality on trans-border data flows, however, disregards another important 
aspect of the Schrems cases that justifies the need for the extraterritoriality of EU 
privacy rights: extraterritorial surveillance. US extraterritorial surveillance is 
designed to target non-US persons and is founded on the basis that US citizenship, 
residence or the presence of an individual on US soil, are ‘criteria of categorical 
normative relevance with regard to the enjoyment of the right to privacy’.97 Indeed, US 
surveillance programmes are ‘inherently discriminatory on grounds of nationality’.98 It 
is misplaced, therefore, to accuse the CJEU of impeding critical intelligence activities 
when it requires some minimum safeguards against abuse and enforceable rights for the 
protection of individuals that are subject to US extraterritorial surveillance without any 
guarantee of effective privacy protections.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The CJEU confirmed in Schrems I the effects of the extraterritorial application of EU 
fundamental rights by invalidating Safe Harbour. While this gave a clear message, the 
decision failed to establish the conditions for extraterritoriality, both internally and 
externally. Internally, the ‘essence’ of the fundamental right to privacy was used as the 
benchmark to assess the US surveillance measures, with the unfortunate consequence 
of confining this concept to a minimum level of protection that entailed incorrect 
assumptions about the way modern surveillance is undertaken. Externally, the 
infringement of the essence of EU fundamental rights barred any serious discussion of 
US law ‒ as it was considered redundant ‒ and left the Court open to criticisms from 
the other side of the Atlantic. As such, the claim for extraterritoriality of EU privacy 
rights remained weak. 
Schrems II presents a more robust internal and external approach to 
extraterritoriality that brings legal certainty and clarity both with regard to the question 
 
97 Milanovic (n 88 above), 89.  
98 Tzanou (n 7 above), 556.  
 21 
of applicability of EU law and with regard to the merits of assessing external 
interference with EU fundamental rights. The CJEU avoided an analysis based on the 
‘essence’ of EU fundamental rights and undertook a more careful examination of US 
law. It showed willingness to follow a more flexible approach with respect to 
extraterritoriality by constructing a test of minimum safeguards against abuse that takes 
into account the specificities of external settings.   
It remains to be seen how Schrems II fits in with the Commission’s ambition to 
promote ‘convergence of data protection standards at international level’ and the goal 
to 
ensure that when companies active in the European market are called on the basis of a 
legitimate request to share data for law enforcement purposes, they can do so without 
facing conflicts of law and in full respect of EU fundamental rights.99 
While conflicts of law seem unavoidable, Schrems II takes a first step towards a more 
reasonable, clear and principled way to addressing these.   
  
 
99 Communication From the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, ‘Data protection 
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